The South’s Napoleon vs. Uncle Sam’s General: A Military Analysis of Robert E. Lee vs. Ulysses S. Grant

 George Bourke Foster

Sturgis Charter Public School West, Hyannis, Massachusetts

January 26, 2026

Introduction

When it comes to famous military men, it is hardly rare to have a rival, with conflicts between men like Hannibal Barca and Scipio Africanus or Erwin Rommel and Bernard Montgomery being popular subjects of analysis. And concerning the United States, there is one famous rivalry that has stood the test of time and even today still sees debate by historians: the rivalry of Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee.

            The story of these two Civil War giants is well known and has been etched into the annals of US military history, and for good reason. Lee has often been praised as a Southern version of Napoleon Bonaparte for his bold, aggressive nature and tactical skill, having beaten larger forces under Union command at battles such as Chancellorsville with daring.^[1] Grant, while viewing war in a more simplified way than Lee, did achieve stunning success in the Western Theater, such as at Vicksburg, having gained a reputation for his determined, unrelenting nature when on campaign and showing a strong strategic understanding of the war as a whole.^[2] Both men are considered the best of the best by their respective sides, having won major victories that are still studied to this day.

Yet, as is common, when two great men are placed side by side, they are bound to be competitively compared. And considering the divisive nature of the American Civil War, it is hardly shocking that the two have been torn down and lifted up by admirers and critics alike.  This is especially true for Grant, who, despite having been on the winning side of the war, has been described as “a plodding, dim-witted commander who enjoyed superior manpower and material and whose crude idea of strategy was to launch large, brutal assaults upon the enemy.”^[3]  Lee, meanwhile, while arguably having received more praise from both former officers and proponents of the Lost Cause, has also seen historians pull him apart for his “alleged strategic or operational shortsightedness, myopic preoccupation with the Eastern Theater (especially Virginia), or inability to understand the Civil War’s true character.”^[4] To put it mildly, both men have their share of critics and supporters.

And it is this rivalry that is the topic of this paper, with the hope of answering one simple question: who was truly the better general of the two during the Civil War, both in terms of tactics and strategy? To answer this, we will examine the origins and actions of these two men, following and analyzing what Lee did in the East, and then what Grant was simultaneously performing in the West. Finally, we look into their climactic matchups, from the Overland Campaign to Appomattox. With this evidence examined, I will argue why I believe that Grant, not Lee, was a better military commander during the Civil War, both in strategy, operations, and even tactics.

Quick Clarificationa

            Before delving into the generalship of these two men, one must consider what it means to be a good general, and it is useful to understand the three most important levels of military action: strategy, operations, and tactics. While the terms and what they represent have mutated over the years, the key principles are similar enough both today and during the US Civil War for us to examine with a modern lens. It would also be prudent to examine what was the character of the Civil War, what the overall objectives were for each side, and also how a good commander would go about achieving these objectives.

 To summarize, strategy is a nation’s determination of its war aims and how to use resources to achieve them. Operations include the campaigns conducted to achieve these goals, and tactics are applied within individual battles and engagements.^[5] While these can be intermingled and are hardly ever truly independent of each other, it is more helpful and accurate to divide the levels of war like this rather than keep them all jumbled together. After all, it is hard to compare the actions of a nation’s entire military to the actions of a single part of said military.

            To get an idea of how these levels of war would play out, generally a commander would be given strategic objectives by a nation's political leadership as well as information on the importance of the assigned operations and resources allocated to them (for example, he may be given 70,000 men and ordered to take several major cities). Based on this, they could then begin to develop their operational plan, designing their campaigns, and ensuring their force was ready for what would happen next.^[6] Once a battle was joined, the commander would then engage on the tactical level, launching maneuvers and plans related to specific engagements.

            Next, we must understand the character of the Civil War and what both sides sought to achieve. Simply put, the character of war refers to specific aspects of a conflict that separate it from other conflicts. For the US Civil War, characteristics include the use of weapons such as rifled muskets and cannons.^[7] In addition, the mass field battles that occurred using Napoleonic style “linear” tactics were another key feature.^[8] And of course, the overall objectives of the Union and Confederacy during the war were namely, to forcibly maintain the Union and forcibly break away from it, respectively, with the issue of slavery also playing a key role in Southern secession.^[9]

            And finally, we must provide a template for “good generalship.” To achieve this, I draw upon the definition of Professor Daniel J. Lynch. Lynch argued that to be an effective commander or “successfully practice operational leadership,” one must develop a plan that will achieve operational/strategic objectives; communicate that plan to subordinates; manage the execution of said plan and modify it if necessary; and, of course, ensure the forces are well provisioned.^[10] While implied in Lynch’s definition, I would like to emphasize that having a strong relationship with the political leadership as well as their forces is key. If a general is not on good terms with either their boss or their own men, or if they fail to communicate with either of them properly, the results could be catastrophic.

The Napoleon of the South

Early Life and Formative Experience

            Born on January 19, 1807, at Stanford Hall, Virginia, Robert Edward Lee was the fifth of six children, coming from a family steeped in fame and fortune, with Lee’s father being a famous Revolutionary War general and politician, while his mother’s family owned a large plantation.^[11]

However, the young Lee’s childhood took a turn from this privilege and was marred by a debt-ridden father who left in 1813, forcing his family to rely on relatives.^[12] Thankfully for Lee, an opportunity arose in the form of an arranged meeting with Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in 1824, and the following year Lee was recommended for admission to the United States Military Academy at West Point.^[13]

While Lee undoubtedly had a sense of patriotism contributing to this decision, his family’s less-than-stable financial situation certainly served as further motivation. During his time at West Point, Lee earned not a single demerit and graduated second in his class in 1829.^[14] Upon his graduation, he became a commissioned member of the Corps of Engineers, building coastal fortifications in Georgia and Virginia, which would be an important experience for his years ahead. During this time, he also met and married Mary Custis, the great-granddaughter of Martha Washington.^[15] Within six years, Lee not only managed to provide a sense of economic stability for himself, but also managed to regain the lost privilege and honor scattered by his father, making Lee an educated, wealthy man.^[16]

            At this point, it is worth mentioning what settled in the mind of Lee in terms of military doctrine. At West Point, Lee had primarily been trained in building fortifications and had studied the military engineers, such as Vauban, and, as previously mentioned, spent several years on fortification projects across the country following graduation. However, like many men of the time, Lee had studied and would go on to implement, if not copy, the practices of Napoleon Bonaparte. In particular, Lee had admired the boldness of Napoleon, with the Corsican’s preference for an aggressive strategic posture and bold flanking attacks to win decisive engagements rubbing off on the Virginian. Yet it is important to remember that Lee was only trained in a curriculum for engineers and company-level officers, not generals who commanded armies.^[17] For Lee to become what he is remembered as, he would need to get his boots dirty. And soon enough, he would.

            In 1846, the Mexican-American War provided some of this needed experience. Serving under Major General Winfield Scott, Lee distinguished himself with his bold reconnaissance and hard work ethic. Scott trusted Lee to such an extent that he proclaimed him “the very best soldier I ever saw on the field.”^[18] In turn, Lee looked up to Scott and took away several key lessons, such as the importance of a competent staff, of reconnaissance, and of the independence granted to subordinates when battle was joined.^[19] This last point is significant, as it was a methodology that Lee would maintain during the Civil War, with Lee himself saying that once the forces were coordinated for battle, he would leave the rest in the hands of  “God and… subordinate officers.”^[20] While this was a policy Lee could never truly maintain and would break, it would explain why certain events went the way they did and why Lee could become exasperated with his officers. Serving Scott also provided Lee with experiences that reinforced lessons from West Point, including the use of fortifications and audacious flanking attacks.^[21]  

            After the Mexican-American War, Lee continued his service, notably becoming the tenth superintendent at West Point in 1852. He also spent time with the Second US Cavalry in Texas, now ranked as Lieutenant Colonel, although events at home kept him in Virginia for a few years.^[22]  

By 1860, mounting tension over the issue of slavery had reached peak levels, and was exacerbated further with the election of the anti-slavery Lincoln. The idea of secession became mainstream in the South. Throughout all this chaos, Lee had been watching with dismay and hoped the worst would not come to pass. While Lee had served the Union for more than 30 years, he held greater sympathy for the South. In his mind, if the South’s rights, guaranteed by the Constitution, were denied to them, then it could legally secede.^[23] When Lee referred to these rights, he primarily (if not exclusively) was referring to slavery. As Rafuse states, “Lee was a slave owner (either directly or through his family), accepted the South’s ‘peculiar institution,’ relied on the labor of slaves at Arlington [his plantation], and was capable of ordering severe punishments when they proved troublesome.”^[24] Furthermore, it is important to remember that during this time, loyalty to a state was just as, if not more, common than loyalty to the Federal government. As such, Lee, along with one-third of the army’s officer corps, chose to join their native states in resistance. As Grant himself would say years later in 1878 in the New York Herald, “the Southern feeling in the army among high officers was so strong that when the war broke out the army dissolved.”^[25] And unfortunately for the North, many of these men were (at least on paper) very competent commanders due to the South’s pride in martial and military prowess.^[26]

Based on these perspectives, it is hardly difficult to understand why Lee opted to show support for a South that maintained the economic status quo, and why he would soon throw his lot in with the side that even he recognized was on the back foot. When the South voted to secede from the Union, declaring the independence of the Confederate States of America and electing Jefferson Davis as its President on February 4, 1861, Lee chose his side.^[27]

On April 12, 1861, the war officially commenced when Confederate forces fired on the Union garrison at Fort Sumter.^[28] Lincoln called for 75,000 men and offered Lee command of the Union forces as hostilities broke out. However, on April 18, Lee refused to accept, offered his resignation two days later, and rode south to Richmond.^[29] He would later tell his sister, Ann, that “save in the defense of my state, I never desire again to draw my sword.”^[30]

            Upon returning to Richmond on April 23, Lee found himself appointed Major General and head of all military forces in Virginia.^[31] The reasoning for this was mostly because of his military experience in places such as Mexico, but also because he was a “Virginian of the Virginians” and was a respected gentleman and member of the Southern upper class.^[32]

As part of Davis’ defensive strategy during the first year, Lee’s first task was to organize and man defenses to repel assaults along the border. At first, this strategy seemed to work, as Confederate victories such as the First Battle of Bull Run shattered the idea of a quick and one-sided war for the North and demonstrated the Southern will to fight on. However, this did concede the initiative to the Federals, who in early 1862 began to advance along rivers, including the Cumberland and Tennessee. Furthermore, the Union Navy captured installations along the coasts of Georgia and the Carolinas, and even took New Orleans in April. Worst of all, though, in late March 1862, a massive Union Army under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan landed on the Virginia peninsula near Fort Monroe, with the capital of Richmond in his sights. Thankfully for Richmond, Lee was already there, having been called back by Davis.^[33]

The Peninsula Campaign and the Seven Days Battles

When Lee arrived on March 13, 1862, in Richmond to answer Davis’ summons, he was informed that he had been put in charge of “the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy, making Lee Davis’ chief advisor on the war.^[34] The reasoning for this was mostly because of his military experience in places such as Mexico, but also because he was a respected member of the Southern upper class.^[35]

After arriving on the Virginia Peninsula, McClellan and his Army of the Potomac s made an overcautious decision to take Yorktown through siege.^[36] The rationale for this cautious approach was that, simply put, McClellan had poor sources. While Confederate troop numbers at this battle are inconsistent, despite McClellan's own strength during the Peninsula Campaign being around 90,000-100,000 men, he somehow believed that Confederate forces outnumbered him two to one. In reality, Johnston’s force was weaker.^[37] With this miscalculation, McClellan gave the Confederates an advantage and began surrounding Yorktown rather than attacking, a plan that did not change even once Gen. Joseph E. Johnston arrived on April 13 to reinforce the Confederate garrison.^[38]

            Even in the face of McClellan’s poor decision, Confederate commanders were worried. Johnston knew that even with Yorktown's defenses, the town's capture was inevitable, made worse if McClellan had time to use his engineers, artillery, and navy to trap Johnston’s forces.^[39] The only hope Johnston saw was if McClellan could be enticed to attack the defenders, yet Johnston lamented that “no one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack us.”^[40]

            In the face of this, Johnston decided to cut his losses, withdrawing on May 3, while McClellan followed at a slow pace. Due to the threat of Union naval attacks, Johnston did not stop until behind the Chickahominy River, bringing McClellan closer to Richmond.

Lee and Davis, seeing that this defensive stance had done nothing of benefit for them, learned an important early lesson and changed their operational level to offensive.^[41] To them, losing Richmond would be too great a loss to Confederate morale, and they were determined to hold it at any cost. In one tearful meeting, Lee expressed that “Richmond must not be given up - it shall not be given up.”^[42] As such, Lee decided to go on the operational offensive and hit back to maintain this strategic objective.

            The first step in Lee’s offensive plan was to take advantage of Lincoln’s concern over D.C. Having seen the success of Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s campaign in Shenandoah, Lee sent him two divisions as reinforcements even before Yorktown fell, and encouraged Jackson to give Lincoln new cause for anxiety. From May 8 to May 25, Jackson won three major engagements against Union forces under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks, including at the towns of McDowell, Front Royal, and Winchester. In response, a panicked Washington redirected forces under Irwin McDowell from McClellan’s command on the Peninsula to try to trap Jackson.  The Union plan ultimately failed as Jackson escaped and won two more victories at Cross Keys and Port Republic on June 8 and 9.^[43] Things got so bad that Lincoln decided to combine all the separate Union forces into the new Union Army of Virginia on June 26 under the command of Maj. Gen. John Pope, and tasked him with protecting the Shenandoah Valley and Washington.^[44]

            Meanwhile, following Lee’s directive, Johnston attacked the portion of McClellan's forces south of the Chickahominy on May 31, gaining several grievous wounds that left Lee to command the Army of Northern Virginia.^[45]By this point, the situation was less than enviable for Richmond, as while McClellan’s methodical nature meant that Lee had plenty of time to plan an attack, the Union fortifications would make any attack fruitless. In this “battle of posts,” as Lee called it, the Yankees could simply build one strong fortified position after another, and the Confederate forces would be powerless to stop them.^[46] McClellan, today seen as one of the worst generals of the Civil War, seems to have been Lee’s biggest challenge. At the time, it seemed as if Lee would fall to a similar fate as Johnston had, and that the Confederate capital would be retaken. There was only one problem with this: it didn’t happen.

Lee, finding some of that Napoleonic flair, seems to have been able to use McClellan’s delaying to his advantage, realizing how he could nullify the Union fortifications. In a letter to Davis, Lee stated, “I am preparing a line that I can hold with part of our forces in front, while with the rest I will endeavor to… bring McClellan out.”^[47] When Lee referred to “the rest” of his forces, he was referring to Jackson, who, on June 10, he ordered to move back south and attack the Union forces on the northern side of the Chickahominy River. Jackson attacked on June 26, followed by Lee not long after, kicking off what is known as the Seven Days Battle. McClellan, not expecting to be attacked, withdrew south towards a new base of supply along the James River. Lee gave chase, hoping to wipe out McClellan's army and end the threat once and for all. However, a mix of poor communication among subordinates and stiff Union resistance meant that Lee suffered grievous losses and McClellan managed to escape by July 1.^[48]

Overall, Lee’s victory was an astonishment. While the Union Army of the Potomac was still a threat, it had been pushed back from Richmond when it seemed to have the city in its jaws. All of this combined boosted the respect Lee had among the rebelling states, which, less than a year before, hardly viewed the ditch-digging “Granny Lee” of Virginia as a preordained commander.^[49]

Then there was Lee himself, who took away key lessons yet also failed to realize an important reality about the war. In terms of gained knowledge, the battle showed Lee that giving up the initiative would not see any real benefit for the Confederacy on the battlefield, especially considering Union superiority in numbers and resources.^[50] To win, Lee could never let the opponent gain the upper hand or choose where to fight, a mindset that he would maintain for the rest of the war, even when its application did not seem practical. However, the real issue Lee held with Seven Days was that the Union Army of the Potomac still existed. He lamented how the enemy army, whose destruction could have ended the war (in theory), had survived and believed that “under ordinary circumstances the Union army should have been destroyed.”^[51]

Second Battle of Bull Run

While today we may see that Lee undoubtedly had expectations that were overblown, he was hardly wrong to be angry. McClellan had stationed himself at Harrison’s Landing, and the Union Army of Virginia, under Pope, was now obligated to act according to the needs of McClellan. As such, Pope had ordered the majority of his forces to deploy around passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains (east of Shenandoah), while also sending Banks to destroy railroads connecting to towns such as Gordonsville, vital for Confederate supplies in the region.^[52]

In response to this, Lee immediately dispatched Jackson with two divisions on July 12 to Gordonsville, arriving just before the Union advance force under Banks. Then, on July 27, hoping that Jackson could defeat Pope and then turn around to help fight McClellan, Lee sent 12,000 men under A.P. Hill to Jackson, and by August 7, had granted Jackson authority to act independently. However, while Jackson was called a ‘stone wall’, he did not wait for these orders and instead moved out, hoping to hit Union forces before Pope (who had been in D.C.) arrived and organized them. As such, Jackson engaged in fighting near Cedar Mountain on August 9, with the battle becoming a back-and-forth slog that ultimately saw Jackson (who hadn’t divulged his entire plan to Hill) not only fail in his overall objective but also lose 1,365 men to the Union’s 2,381.^[53]

Seeing Jackson’s struggle, as well as McClellan's withdrawal from the peninsula, Lee decided on August 14 to move his entire force north to link up with Jackson and defeat Pope, arriving in Gordonsville on the 15th. Lee hoped to outflank Pope and cut off his supplies with cavalry while using the mountains as cover, yet logistical delays prevented quick movement, and by August 20, Pope had withdrawn behind the defensible Rappahannock River. Desperate to achieve something before McClellan (at Aquila landing near D.C.) arrived, Lee came up with a risky plan that would have Jackson take J.E.B Stuart's cavalry and half the army and cross further north, get behind Pope’s communications and force him to turn his army, giving the remaining forces under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet an opportunity to attack. Since Lee gave him and Longstreet near complete autonomy to act, Jackson eagerly agreed and began his march on August 25, crossing the river and moving on Manassas on the night of August 26, Longstreet following behind.^[54]

Pope, meanwhile, pursued Jackson on August 27, who had stripped Manassas of supplies before taking his forces to Stony Ridge, where he could await Longstreet. However, the movement of his divisions was so unorthodox that Pope, lacking good reconnaissance, didn’t really know what was actually happening. Pope’s desperation to find Jackson became so bad that he forgot to keep an eye out for Longstreet, who would soon be moving through the weakly defended Thoroughfare Gap. Long story short, Pope managed to get to Stony Ridge by August 29, but miscommunication meant that much of his forces weren’t where they were supposed to be, and assaults on Jackson didn’t see any progress.^[55]

By the morning of August 30, after Pope had managed to gather his forces, he ordered another assault on Jackson’s position at 1:30 pm. Just as Jackson’s lines began to crumble, Longstreet appeared on the hills above the left flank and smashed Union forces mid-attack with a deadly cannonade, causing them to retreat. Then, Longstreet sent five divisions to take the southern position of Bald Hill, forcing a Union withdrawal, first from the battlefield, then all the way to Washington. Of the roughly 75,000 Union and 50,000 Confederate forces involved, the losses were 14,500 and 9,500, respectively.^[56]

Overall, Bull Run was another success for Lee, once again defeating a superior force with clever maneuvers. However, since Lee had served as more of a planner and less of an active commander, a lot of credit should go to Jackson and Longstreet, albeit the latter still took orders from Lee due to their proximity to one another. Yet the success of his subordinates did not change an unfortunate truth. While at this point Lee had won stunning victories, the problem was that they weren’t decisive victories. Lee had failed to destroy the Union army while bleeding his own forces. Simply put, this was not sustainable, as the agrarian Southern economy failed to match the industrialized and heavily populated North.^[57]As such, Lee’s old view that victory relied solely upon destroying the Northern army was modified into one of also breaking Northern morale.^[58] Essentially, the hope was not only to destroy Northern military capabilities but also to destroy Northern will to continue the war. After all, would the North really want to fight if the road to an imaginary victory was paved by uncounted skulls?

Antietam

In line with this new way of thinking, Lee prepared to launch a new campaign that would see him attack the North itself. And while this was expected after his victories, his target wasn’t, especially to Lee. Lee’s army was not in a strong position, with many men lacking food, ammunition, and even basic clothing like shoes, forcing Lee to consider his options.^[59] If Lee was going to simultaneously maintain his initiative without further depleting his own forces, then he needed to choose a target that gave him the best chance of both damaging Union morale and troops, while also not posing a serious risk to his army or the South itself. Lee, therefore, planned to march into Maryland. This move would directly threaten the North, forcing the Union to send out forces to respond and be defeated on a battlefield of Lee’s choosing.  Importantly, this would show the Union that Washington couldn’t protect the Northern states. It was also Lee’s hope that he could keep the North occupied until winter, when military action against Virginia would be unlikely, thus sparing the South more hardship. Lee began his march out on September 4, his army of 35,000-45,000 men and 246 cannons commanded by Jackson and Longstreet, while Stuart led the cavalry division. This force would reach Frederick on September 7.^[60] Meanwhile, the battered but intact Union Army of Virginia merged into the Army of the Potomac, commanded by McClellan, and was on its way to find them.

At this point, Lee faced a problem. While he wanted to head straight to Maryland, the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry in the Shenandoah (12,000 men) needed to be dealt with. As such, Lee, against the advice of Longstreet, split his army to capture these nuisances on September 10, planning to reunite at Hagerstown by September 13.^[61] It is important to note here that Longstreet, a more cautious commander, was not wrong in his criticism. The idea that the Union would not quickly march any available force out to defend itself was absurd, and while Lee was right to handle the garrisons, his confidence in a quick victory was misplaced, considering that the forces in the area, if well motivated and led, could have possibly delayed him for far longer than three days.

Unsurprisingly, Longstreet’s concern was well placed, as McClellan arrived at Frederick with a force of 80,000 men and 300 cannons on September 13. And the cherry on top was that after arriving, McClellan found a lost copy of Lee’s plans to divide his army up (Gen. Orders 191) thanks to Union scouts.^[62] Even for McClellan, known for being overly cautious, it was hard to shrug off this advantage. When Lee learned about McClellan and sent forces to defend the gaps by South Mountain, McClellan still broke through on September 14, and the mood among the North was so energetic that Lincoln himself told McClellan, “Your dispatch of to-day received. God bless you and all with you! Destroy the rebel army, if possible.”^[63]

Upon seeing this, Lee initially decided to pull back to Virginia, his army too disorganized to hold off the Union onslaught. To prepare for this, Lee took 25,000 men, including Longstreet and some of Stuart’s men, to Sharpsburg, where he could prevent McClellan from hitting his men at Harpers’ Ferry from behind.^[64] However, with Harper's Ferry’s fall on September 15, Lee opted to stay and fight, believing that the victory “reanimated the courage of the troops.”^[65]

While at the time some would have viewed this as proof of Lee’s honor and bravery in action, today, it is also proof of Lee’s overconfidence. On the one hand, both the right wing of his army (under Longstreet) and the left (later under Jackson) had strong defensible positions, with the former having the Antietam Creek in front, while the latter (as well as the center) had a north-south ridgeline they could defend from, with Jackson’s forces centering around Dunker Church, surrounded by woods to the east, west, and north and overlooking a cornfield. However, the Confederate back was to the Potomac River, while the defenses under Jackson were not contiguous.^[66] While this did allow Lee more reserves to reinforce weak points in his line, it also increased the risk of a Union breakthrough. To be fair, it has been theorized that Lee, eager to bleed the enemy, had intended to use these reserves to hide behind the ridgeline to launch a devastating attack on the Union left after its “inevitable” breakthrough and wipe out a portion of the Federal army.^[67]However, while in Lee’s playbook as a commander, it was still a risky move that, if true, failed.

Arriving at Antietam the afternoon of September 15, McClellan quickly reorganized his forces, placing artillery batteries on high ground overlooking the creek. The next day, McClellan, ever the cautious man, held back again due to fog, allowing Jackson to arrive and take up the mentioned position.^[68] According to McClellan himself, the plan was to have the corps under Hooker and Mansfield attack Lee’s left flank, while Burnside would advance on the right. If either attack was successful, then the Union center would join in the assault.^[69]

At 6:00 am on September 17, Hooker began his advance through the North Wood, launching a devastating bombardment on the Cornfield and other positions. Afterwards, two of his divisions attacked, pushing Lawton's division back from the Cornfield. This forced Jackson to call upon Hood’s division, which exploded forth and, at great cost, pushed Union forces back until the XII Corps arrived and repulsed them. At 9:00 am, two divisions from Charles Sumner’s arrived and moved on the West Woods, being repulsed and counterattacked again before Union forces behind them stabilized the situation. Throughout this period, Lee generally allowed his subcommanders to maintain control, yet as the situation got more desperate, he was forced to take a more hands-on approach in sending reinforcements and giving orders. Unfortunately for Lee, the battle's growing intensity did not allow him to take a hands-off approach, showing how bad the situation would be if Lee (hands-off general) had to personally get involved.^[70]

Following the Cornfield carnage, Union forces made two more large-scale attacks, the first being an attack on the Sunken Road, the Confederate center. This attack, beginning amidst Sumner’s assault, was carried out by William French’s division against the division of D.H. Hill. Desperate fighting ensued, and as more Union divisions arrived, they managed to slowly force a Confederate withdrawal by noon. However, this new gap in the lines, which could have doomed the Confederates, was not exploited.^[71] Instead, McClellan continued to push the assault by Burnside on the right flank of Lee’s army. Starting at around 10:00 am, the IX Corps attacked the 400 men of Robert Toombs at the lower bridge, only for the assault to continue until 1:00 pm, Burnside only taking the bridge after Union forces found other fords to cross. It wouldn’t be until 3:00 pm that the corps began moving, by which point A.P. Hill’s division arrived and forced a withdrawal by dark. The next day saw no major engagements, and by September 19, Lee withdrew, McClellan not pursuing.^[72] Of the 70,000 Union troops engaged, 13,000 were killed or wounded, while the 35,000 Confederate forces suffered almost as badly.^[73]

Although a missed opportunity for the Union to crush Lee’s army, Lee had ultimately lost. While the objective of gathering supplies had been achieved and Lee had yet again gone toe to toe with a larger army, the fact that Lee’s army withdrew from the field of battle conceded victory. As such, despite his many mistakes, McClellan was still able to provide the North with a morale boost, a boost that could have been blunted or avoided if Lee had chosen to retreat earlier, which may have given the impression that he slipped through Union fingers in “daring escape”.

Fredericksburg

Following his failure to annihilate Lee at Antietam, Lincoln dismissed McClellan on November 7 and replaced him with Ambrose Burnside, who quickly drafted a plan to cross the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg and then advance southward from there with 120,000 men. Unfortunately, Lee was aware of the plan and reached Fredericksburg with 78,000 men before Burnside was even ready to cross the river. The resulting attack on December 13 on Lee’s uphill position was therefore a massacre, with 12,600 Union losses to his 5,400.^[74] While this was an easy victory that showed Lee’s tactical skill in defense, Lee lamented the enemy’s survival, knowing that his losses were not sustainable.  “I was much depressed. We had really accomplished nothing.”^[75]

Chancellorsville

After Burnside's blunder at Fredericksburg, it was “Fighting” Joe Hooker’s turn to lead in 1863, and this time he developed a plan that could succeed. On April 30, taking 130,000 men, Hooker left two corps across from Fredericksburg while the rest of his army would cross the Rapidan River further north. In response, Lee split his 60,000 men, leaving a force under Jubal Early, while the rest of his army moved west toward Chancellorsville, forcing Hooker to halt. In a move that has been lauded over ever since, Lee sent Jackson’s corps around Union lines on May 2, hitting the Union flank by surprise and causing a rout, allowing Lee to press the attack.^[76]

Unfortunately for the Rebels, this momentum was arrested when, on May 3, Jackson was mortally wounded by his own men (J.E.B. Stuart took command), and despite the advance, Hooker managed to dig in on new positions. The last hope for crushing Hooker’s army was lost after the remaining Union forces took Fredericksburg, forcing Lee to halt his assault on May 4-5. By May 6, Hooker (impaired by a head injury) withdrew. By the end, the tally was 16,800 blue coats to 13,100 grey coats, which on paper is astounding considering Hooker’s numerical superiority.^[77]

Despite being called Lee’s masterpiece by historians like Ethan S. Rafuse, the victory had a number of shortcomings that even Lee recognized. First and foremost, Hooker escaped unmolested, with Lee complaining to his subordinates that “you allow those people to get away. I tell you what to do, but you don’t do it.”^[78] Furthermore, had Hooker not been wounded and mentally impaired, it is very likely he would have held his position and allowed the aggressive Lee to batter his head against his fortifications, increasing the already high casualty count. Then, of course, there was the death of Jackson, arguably one of Lee’s best commanders and not easily replaced, along with the heavy losses that were proportionally higher than the North’s. All of this combined turns the tactical artwork that was Chancellorsville into a bittersweet victory at best. And if Lee’s supposed “greatest victory” had this many problems, then it becomes more of a limit than a value in the argument of Lee’s martial skill.

Gettysburg

Following Chancellorsville, Lee spoke to Davis on May 14 about the allocation of forces to other fronts, particularly at Vicksburg, where Union forces under Grant were making headway. Lee argued against this, believing that with enough men, he could strike north again as he had done previously, while stating that reinforcements to Vicksburg wouldn’t arrive on time. Davis, despite misgivings, agreed, and Lee planned to advance through the Shenandoah into Maryland and Pennsylvania, the objective being to break Union morale through another victory, while also living off the land to spare the struggling South the hardship of supplying tens of thousands of soldiers.^[79]

Before marching, Lee reorganized his army into three corps since the previous corps sizes, 30,000 men, seemed too large for one man to command. The new corps were assigned to the promoted Lt. Gen. Longstreet, A.P. Hill, and newcomer Richard S. Ewell. With this done, Lee began moving his army on June 9, passing through the Shenandoah Valley and looting along the way. As the Army of the Potomac began to follow him, he rapidly picked up his pace and would reach Pennsylvania by June 21. On June 28, as the Federals pursued, Lee learned that Hooker was replaced as Union commander by Major General George Gordon Meade, due to the former's disputes with Lincoln and his chief of staff, Henry Halleck.^[80] This change was troublesome as Lee, respecting Meade, worried that “General Meade will commit no blunder in my front.”^[81] Furthermore, Lee also suffered from a lack of reconnaissance, as he had sent his cavalry under Stuart to circumnavigate the Union forces and meet him up north, but he lost contact with them and thus was in the dark.^[82]

Despite all this, it should be noted that Lee was incredibly confident in his campaign's success, stating that “they will come up, probably through Fredrick; broken down with hunger and hard marching, strung out on a long line and much demoralized when they come into Pennsylvania. I shall throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it, follow up the success, drive one corps back and another, and by successive repulses and surprises before they can concentrate; create a panic and virtually destroy their army.”^[83] This optimism would be put to the test on July 1, while looking for supplies, 30,000 of his 75,000 scattered forces (primarily under Ewell and Hill) engaged 28,000 men of the Union advance force at Gettysburg.^[84] When Lee arrived to take command following a Union withdrawal to hills south of Gettysburg, he ordered Ewell to “to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army.”^[85] Ewell, taking this as a suggestion, believed it was not practicable, allowing Union forces to hold their positions and await Meade’s arrival the next day.

On July 2, with both Longstreet's and Meade’s arrival, Lee launched a series of attacks on the Union flanks with 28,000 men. However, due to the sheer length of the frontline (five miles), Lee struggled to synchronize these assaults, allowing Meade to shift forces and hold the line. Despite this, Lee didn’t want to concede defeat and believed that the center would be weaker than the flanks, and if broken, he could force a route as he had done previously. As such, on July 3, while sending the recently arrived Stuart to hit the Union from behind, he sent 15,000 men under Maj. Gen. George Pickett to hit the Union center. Despite protests from Longstreet, the attack commenced after a long bombardment, only for the exposed Confederates to be shredded by Union fire, killing 55% of the assault force. In a role reversal for the ages, Lee would end up withdrawing over the next few days, while Meade was too weak to pursue, much to Lincoln's chagrin. Of the 75,000 men Lee brought to the battle, roughly 28,000 became casualties compared to 23,000 Union soldiers from Meade’s 90,000.^[86]

While Lee had escaped with his army back south, his plan to break Northern morale and force a settlement backfired horribly, with the defeat being so great that he requested his dismissal from command (Davis refused, mainly because Lee was still seemingly his best general). However, despite the men who bled at Gettysburg and Lee's broken pride, Lee’s withdrawal had saved a sizable army that would be able to keep fighting for two more years. And since he had taken the fight north, he had not lost any Southern territory. Nevertheless, the psychological impact that Lee could be defeated was enough for the North. Combined with the victory of Grant at Vicksburg, Lee had failed in his goal to break Northern morale and indeed handed them both a morale victory at Gettysburg by his tactical blunders, and a strategic victory at Vicksburg due to his myopic focus on Virginia.

Languishing

After this, Lee and his army would spend a year in relative inactivity, suffering from low supplies while Lee himself dealt with poor health. Over the next few months, Lee would engage in a waltz with Meade, posturing forces but never truly engaging him in battle. Despite this inactivity, Lee still objected when forces under Longstreet were deployed in the West.^[87] And despite evidence showing otherwise, he even went as far as to state that “if I were a little stronger, I think I could drive Meade’s army under cover of the fortifications in Washington.” ^[88] This was despite how his previous force (larger than his current one) had failed spectacularly in just such a move. Yet no action was taken, and Lee would be given time to lick his wounds before he would meet the North’s saving grace, who had been out West reminding each Dixie man to mind his Uncle Sam.

Summary Analysis

Overall, Lee undoubtedly was a strong commander who managed to do a lot with comparatively very little. He was an impressive tactician and battlefield commander, utilizing flanking maneuvers to achieve great success at Seven Days, Second Bull Run, and Chancellorsville, while also showing competent defensive capabilities at Antietam and Fredericksburg. The willingness to maintain the initiative and choose where he fought clearly paid off. Yet he undoubtedly had flaws, particularly in his overall strategic vision, logistics, reliance on enemy mistakes, and command structure. His plan to break Northern morale was by no means a bad one, but his continual hope to achieve this through wiping out the enemy completely on the battlefield was overblown due to his small army and the North’s population.  He also seemed focused on Virginia, not caring for other fronts and commanders, as if he was the biggest priority. While the logistical situation he was dealt was by no means his fault, the best answer he could provide for it was to raid enemy supplies, the effort to do so likely only draining him further. His victories, while impressive, often saw him suffer a higher casualty percentage than the enemy, and many of these battles were only called victories because the enemy withdrew first, even when they could have stayed. If Hooker had remained at Chancellorsville, he could have likely turned his fortune around. And finally, Lee’s discretion and lack of clarity with his commanders could backfire, most famously with Stuart’s cavalry abandoning him before Gettysburg, and Ewell not finishing off Union forces at Gettysburg on the first day, two things which could have turned Gettysburg into another victory.

U.S.G. — Uncle Sam’s General

Early Life and Formative Experience

            In stark contrast to the highborn Lee, Grant was born in a rural town near Cincinnati, Ohio, on April 27, 1822, to a modest family who took pride in their Puritan and American heritage, and possible military service by ancestors in the Revolutionary War. One advantage Grant had over Lee was that both his father and mother, Jesse Root Grant and Hannah Simpson Grant, deeply cared for him, fostering a boy who enjoyed politics and history.^[89]

            Yet to the sheepish Grant, his father must have seemed to be overcompensating when he, desperate to provide Grant a future, put him forward to their state congressman as a nominee for West Point. Grant got in and was by no means a bad student, excelling in math and horsemanship, while gaining respect from other cadets. On the other hand, he could seem careless in other studies and ultimately graduated 21st out of 39 in 1843. Following the Academy, Grant served in the Mexican-American War, serving under Zachary Taylor and gaining logistical experience as a quartermaster, while also seeing action at Molino del Rey and Cosme Gate under Winfield Scott.^[90] While Grant would be promoted to brevet Captain, the biggest learnings he took from both West Point and Mexico were arguably interactions with future allies and enemies, including Lee himself, whom he stated, “I had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that I felt this.”^[91]

            Yet while Lee was mortal, he still had better luck after the war than Grant. While marrying Julia Dent in 1848 and eventually earning the rank of  Captain of the 4th Infantry in 1853, Grant would ultimately resign from the Army on April 11, 1854.^[92] He had both a desire to be with his family (he was stationed on the West Coast), and he was unable to support his growing family on an army salary. Unfortunately, he continued to struggle even after resigning, having to accept a job at his father’s tanner store for work in Galena, Illinois in 1860.^[93]

            When the Civil War broke out, Grant found himself swept up in patriotic fervor, and while not a full-blown Republican, he began to view Unionism and Abolitionism as intertwined. Combined with his residence in loyal Illinois and his previous experience, he theoretically would have little issue rising the ranks of the Union Army.  As such, he quickly sought re-enlistment, and after some jockeying by his ally Senator Elihu Washburne, Governor Richard Yates first made him an administrator, then a trainer, and finally, on June 16, 1861 a Colonel over the 21st Illinois, a regiment he quickly whipped into shape.^[94] Despite his eagerness to find success in the army, Grant, unlike others, recognized the war would not be quickly won, telling a friend, “those fellows [the Southerners] mean [to] fight, and Uncle Sam has a heavy job on his hands.”^[95] His prediction, while simple, was accurate.

            Grant’s rapid climb up the chain of command would continue. In August 1861 he was promoted by Lincoln to Brigadier General, briefly serving under Maj. Gen. John Fremont of the Western Department, a man whose incompetence and disrespect for Lincoln would serve as the first of many examples to Grant of bad generalship.^[96] During this time, Grant would be made head of the District of Southeast Missouri, from which he would primarily operate against Kentucky and Tennessee. To handle this growing responsibility, Grant called upon his old friend John Rawlins to serve as his Chief of Staff, a man who would help Grant handle paperwork and organization, as well as help Grant avoid alcohol, an important detail we will come back to.^{[97], [98]}  Grant would be operating out of Cairo, Illinois, and the city was “the most unhealthy post within my [Fremont’s] command.”^[99] To be blunt, Rawlins' aid would be appreciated.

Belmont

            With this new appointment, Grant’s focus was primarily on Confederate forces in and around Kentucky, which would be a perfect staging ground for Confederate attacks northward. Lincoln himself once said, “I hope to have God on my side, but I must have Kentucky.”^[100] Yet, unfortunately for Grant, so long as Fremont was in command, he could do little more than make minor advances and send reinforcements when called upon. However, upon Fremont’s removal on November 2 and replacement by Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, Grant used the transition period to attack Confederate forces at Belmont, near their main base at Columbus. The objective of this attack was officially to disrupt Confederate forces and communications in the area, but it also seems that Grant wanted to provide experience for his green troops.^[101] On November 7, Grant took 3,000 men (out of his 20,000) along the river and attacked Belmont, temporarily routing the rebels before being forced to withdraw when the enemy unexpectedly returned.^[102] While not accomplishing anything decisive, Belmont did serve as a good testing ground and provided experience for Grant and the troops before a more serious battle happened.

A Beastly Drunk

Unfortunately, Henry Halleck of the renamed Department of Missouri, while a competent administrator, was a very by-the-book, slow, and cautious commander, and was also politically motivated and confrontational with other commanders like Don Carlos Buell (and later Grant) over power. While working under him, Grant would spend most of his time handling logistics and stopping illicit practices, the latter leading to some unfortunate rumors.^[103] One of these rumors led to one of the most common stereotypes about Grant -  that he was a raving drunk who allowed his addiction to corrupt him to the point of incompetence and self-embarrassment.  However, at the time, many of these accusations were from rivals or those holding a grudge, and were likely later exploited by political rivals during his Presidency and by Lost Cause advocates. This is important to consider now because it was around this time that Grant was first accused of such behavior by William J. Kountz. After Grant arrested him for disobedience on Jan 14, 1862, Kountz stated that Grant was “drinking with traitors and enemies to the Federal government, while under a flag of truce” and “getting drunk at the St. Charles Hotel and losing his sword and uniform.”^[104] This was only the first of many rumors that Grant would be accused of, with other generals such as Halleck and John A. McClernand joining the accusations to knock Grant down a peg or two. With regard to these rumors, when compared to his overall impressive military accomplishments, it seems probable that the majority were overstated, as how could a raging drunk accomplish what he did? Yet the fact that there were so many to begin with, combined with the fact that Rawlins had to help Grant manage his drinking, does indicate that Grant did have, at a minimum, a minor drinking problem, though not one that appears to have impaired his ability to command.

Forts Henry & Donelson

            While Halleck focused on administrative duties, Grant was promoted to head of the District of Cairo on Dec 23, which notably had access to the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. One of his first acts was to send Union ships to scout them out, as along these two rivers were the Confederate Forts of Henry and Donelson with 5,000 men between them. If captured, Union forces would be able to travel deep into Confederate territory, allowing them to take territory including Nashville and Columbus. By the time Halleck decided to attack, Grant was already ready to go, and was given 15,000 men and nine gunboats to take the forts, setting out on February 2, 1862.^[105]

 On February 6, before even getting infantry involved, Fort Henry surrendered after a quick naval bombardment, encouraging Grant to move on Donelson even faster, especially after the overall Confederate commander in the West, General Albert Sidney Johnston, sent 21,000 troops as reinforcements.^[106] In typical Grant fashion, he didn’t even wait for Halleck to give permission to move his forces ahead, saying, “General Halleck did not approve or disapprove of my going to Fort Donelson. He said nothing whatever to me on the subject.”^[107] While Donelson, sitting 100 feet above the river and having a strong set of trenches, managed to hold out from a naval barrage on February 14, Grant nonetheless surrounded the fort. While briefly taken aback by a Confederate breakout attempt on February 15, Grant nonetheless stabilized his lines and counterattacked. The next day, two-thirds of the Confederate leadership fled, and the fort surrendered, giving Grant 13,000 prisoners, while also securing new routes of access that he would use to take Columbus, Nashville, and Clarksville by February 27.^[108] Grant was quickly promoted to Major General and given the nickname “Unconditional Surrender” Grant for his letter to the fort, which read: “Sir, Yours of this date proposing Armistice, and appointment of commissioners, to settle terms of capitulation is just received. No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.”^[109]

Shiloh

            Following his stunning victory, Grant briefly found himself in trouble with Halleck, who was angry over Grant’s rise in popularity and used the excuse of a lack of reports from Grant as proof for the temporary postponement of command on March 4. Lincoln, happy to have an aggressive general, forced Grant’s reinstatement of the newly made Army of Tennessee on February 15. Grant’s new objective was to take Corinth as part of a larger strategy to take territory on or near the Mississippi River, cutting the Confederacy in two. During this time, Grant received both emotional support and help organizing the army from William Tecumseh Sherman, who, upon Grant’s reinstatement, was organizing around 40,000-50,000 troops at Pittsburgh Landing near the church of Shiloh.^[110] Sherman was arguably Grant’s best commander, who  “knows, he divines, when the supreme hour has come in a campaign of battle, and always boldly seizes it.”^[111] However, the two were also good friends, with Sherman saying, “He [Grant] stood by me when I was crazy, and I stood by him when he was drunk, and now, sir, we stand by each other always.”^[112] And it is no doubt because of this relationship that they endured what was to come.

            One of Grant’s greatest weaknesses as a commander was that he could be more concerned with what he would do rather than the enemy. While this meant he wasn’t overcautious like McClellan or Halleck, it did mean he could have a blind spot, especially for aggressive commanders such as Albert Sidney Johnston and P.T. Beauregard who on March 27 had 49,000 troops at Corinth ready to attack Grant by April 6. Johnston not only had the advantage of surprise, which meant neither Grant nor Sherman had set up fortifications at the landing, but he was also energized and eager for revenge after the Confederate humiliation at Fort Henry and Donelson.^[113]

On the morning of April 6, rebel forces pounced upon Sherman’s unsuspecting Union forces, who were just waking up, causing a general rout by the many inexperienced troops. It was only due to a mix of Sherman's tenacity, a Confederate advance slowed by looting, and a timely arrival by Grant at the landing that total disaster was avoided. Grant helped further stabilize the situation when he rushed to the landing. By evening the fighting had stopped, and despite seven thousand casualties and three thousand men captured, the Union situation had improved. That night, Buell arrived with 25,000 men to bolster the remaining 15,000 able-bodied men. Grant responded to the question of retreat from Buell by stating, “I haven’t despaired of whipping them yet.” And indeed, on April 7, Confederate forces, demoralized by the death of Johnston the previous day, were shocked when the Union bore into them and drove them back. In the end, the battle led to 24,000 casualties between the two armies.^[114] Grant himself commented on the slaughter, saying, “I saw an open field… so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground.”^[115]

In a sense, Shiloh was both Grant’s best and worst performance to this point. While his lack of awareness had nearly led to disaster and the destruction of his army, he had also managed to turn the situation around and ultimately won the fight, gaining no ground yet stopping the Confederate objective of obliterating his forces and washing away Union gains. Shiloh also showed Grant’s tenacity and resolve, as while another commander like Buell would have withdrawn, he held the line and then counterattacked, denying the enemy any satisfaction or sense of success.

Humiliation and Elevation

Yet to others, the blood spilt at Shiloh proved it was no victory, and Grant was vilified in the press as inept and incompetent. Some men called for his court-martial or even execution, going as far as to compare him to the failures of generals fighting in the east. All of this shocked Grant, who never understood why one would twist facts and spread falsehoods in such a manner.^[116] As a result of this, Halleck personally arrived not long after the battle with reinforcements under John Pope, leading the newly combined army in an advance that lasted over a month on the twenty-mile trip to Corinth. The pace of this advance allowed Beauregard to evacuate the city in late May before Halleck arrived.^[117] Grant, now Halleck’s second, quietly fumed over the humiliation, yet advice and counseling by Sherman helped calm his inner fury and prevented him from making any rash decisions, and allowed him to slowly bide his time.^[118]

This patience paid off, as Grant was restored to command as head of the Army of Tennessee on June 10. Then a month later, Halleck was summoned to Washington as General in Chief, and Grant was appointed as head of the following: the District of Missouri, District of Cairo, District of West Tennessee, Army of Tennessee, and the Army of Missouri.^[119] While this made Grant the highest-ranking commander in the Western Theater, it also meant that he would have to quickly consolidate the massive amount of occupied territory he governed, ensuring his supply lines were safe from rebel raids and Confederate generals such as Earl van Dorn. Yet again, he rose to the challenge, notably halting a Confederate counterattack on Corinth on October 3 with the help of General William S. Rosecrans, shattering the enemy’s offensive capability. This victory earned him both reinforcements and promotion to the newly made Department of Tennessee on October 16, further boosting his area of control.^[120] With new forces, supplies consolidated, and the enemy weakened, Grant prepared a campaign that would not only turn the tide of the war but also solidify his place as one of the greats in military history.

Vicksburg

As the last major Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi and the only thing keeping Union forces from cutting the South in two, it was no shock that Lincoln wanted it, and Jefferson Davis needed it.

Upon receiving reinforcements, Grant quickly set out on November 2 from his headquarters in Memphis and began advancing southward, moving as far south as Grenada (halfway point) in five weeks, and making it as far as Oxford by early December. As he advanced, Grant was slowed by rebel raids on his supplies, managing smuggling, and runaway slaves that flocked to his camps. This latter point Grant managed to exploit to his benefit, having John Eaton organize a relief program that had runaway slaves do paid labor on projects that supported the army.^[121]

However, these were mere delays, and the blow that ended Grant’s first Vicksburg campaign was from Major General John A. McClernand. A politically motivated general with little actual experience, McClernand convinced Lincoln to let him raise a new force under his independent command that he could use to take Vicksburg.^[122] While McClernand had served under Grant as far back as Belmont, he had often tried to claim credit for his commander’s victories, despising that he had to serve under an incompetent “drunk.”^[123] When Grant learned of McClernand’s new advancing force, he rushed ahead with his plans, knowing that McClernand’s independent authority and incompetence could overcomplicate and ruin the campaign. His new plan would see Sherman’s forces advance on Vicksburg from Memphis in the north, while he would advance down the Mississippi Central Railroad to Jackson, cutting Vicksburg off from reinforcements. However, raids by Nathan Bedford Forest and Earl Van Dorn on his supply lines, especially at Holly Springs on December 20, forced him to withdraw. Sherman, meanwhile, was halted outside of Vicksburg at Chickasaw Bayou on Dec 29.^[124] The only bright spot in the face of this was that Lincoln came to his senses and relieved McClernand of his command and made him Grant’s subordinate along with all of his forces, temporarily ending issues between the two men.^[125]

At the start of 1863, with Grant relocating west to Young’s Point, Vicksburg was no closer to being captured. The fort, surrounded by bayous, swamps, seven miles of entrenchments, and artillery overlooking the Mississippi, also had 30,000 men stationed there under Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton. It was a nightmare to attack. Yet Grant, undeterred as ever, developed a new plan, ordering naval forces under Admiral David D. Porter to slip past Vicksburg, secure a landing, and allow Grant’s army to march down from Young’s Point, cross the river and secure supplies. Then, after ensuring no threat would come from a nearby Joseph E. Johnston, Grant would surround and take the city. ^[126]

The plan, however, faced issues. First, this plan had been developed during and would be launched after a months-long period where Grant’s army languished in sickness and worked fruitlessly on projects to expand waterways around Vicksburg for gunboats. This led to doubts not only in the press but even from his own men, such as Maj. Gen. John B. McPherson and Sherman himself.^[127] Thankfully, however, even with all of these doubts, Lincoln himself still had hope in Grant, saying, “I want… generals who will fight battles and win victories. Grant has done this, and I propose to stand by him.”^[128]

On April 16, the first of Grant’s gunboats and supply ships began moving past Vicksburg, making it past relatively unscathed by hugging the shoreline, and through the next few days, this stunt was repeated. After this, Grant moved his army of 44,000 men down the west bank of the river, crossing at the secured town of Bruinsburg on April 30.^[129] To further increase his chances, Grant planned to use deception, first sending a cavalry force under Col. Benjamin Greason from April 17 to May 2 to sever railroads and burn supplies.^[130] Then, he deployed Sherman with ten regiments north of Vicksburg as if he would attack, and Pemberton fell for it, scattering his forces to handle the “threat.”^[131] This left the area south of Vicksburg ripe for pillaging, a tactic Grant exploited to the fullest. Having only given his men five days of emergency rations and relying on the abundant spring countryside rather than long, cumbersome supply trains, Grant was able to blitz his way towards Jackson, Vicksburg’s supply hub, before enemy reinforcements arrived and dug in.^[132]After securing himself, Grant marched north to Jackson to handle reinforcements under Joseph E. Johnston, sending him running before he turned around, defeated Pemberton twice in battle, and boxed him up in the city by May 18. After two failed assaults, one of which would see McClernand finally relieved for incompetence and breaking procedure, Grant and the newly arrived forces of Sherman settled in for a siege.^[133] The success was such that even the doubtful Sherman admitted, “until this moment, I never thought your expedition would be a success. I never could see the end clearly; but… this is a success if we never take the town.”^[134]

By July 1, even the stubborn Pemberton recognized his situation was dire, and while he had told Grant he was confident of his position in negotiations, he ultimately was waving the white flag by July 3.^[135] By July 4, after offering Pemberton’s men parole, the city surrendered. Grant’s capture of Vicksburg not only cut the Confederacy in two and cut off supplies needed by Lee, but it also saw 29,500 men captured (on top of the 7,000 killed or wounded) along with 172 artillery pieces, 50,000 small arms, 38,000 artillery projectiles, and 600,000 rounds of ammunition. These were men and materiel the Confederacy would struggle to reproduce. By comparison, Grant suffered a mere 10,000 Union casualties, by no means small but hardly costly for the Civil War.^[136] The victory was the largest military capture on North American soil, and combined with Meade’s impressive (albeit incomplete) success at Gettysburg, turned the tide of the war. Grant’s victory was won through impressive logistics, deception, combined arms operations, tactics, strategy, and is by far his greatest military success. It stands even higher when considering that the greatest success of Lee (and by extension the Confederacy) had only been a dazzling display of tactical brilliance, rather than a war-changing move.

A Budding Friendship

Following his victory, Grant received heaps of praise from the Union. Lincoln especially respected the “fighting general” who had won him so much, and was particularly happy in the fact that “he isn’t shrieking for reinforcements all the time.”^[137] The two men, having not even met, had developed quite a rapport with each other, showing great respect and trust for one another, with Lincoln even considering making Grant head of the Army of the Potomac. The President was especially happy when he heard that Grant believed the Emancipation Proclamation had helped his troops during the Vicksburg campaign, showing Grant subscribed and duly followed government policy.^[138] This point is worth examining, as it not only showed Grant’s opinion on slavery but also reflected how he could exploit abolitionism in his campaigns. Having made use of foraging and living off the land, Grant’s objectives with such a tactic were, of course, to feed his army, but also to wreak havoc on the Southern society and economy. And what better way could Grant achieve this latter point than by freeing the millions of laborers used to harvest cotton, the backbone of Southern wealth, now made legal by Lincoln’s policies. In fact, it was almost certainly because of Lincoln’s love for Grant that he allowed him to take charge of a near fatal change in fortunes.

Chattanooga

Despite hopes to move on quickly to new targets after Vicksburg, this was delayed by management of the new captures, and by a leg injury Grant sustained in late August. By the time he recovered, however, Grant was needed in Tennessee.^[139] At first, Union forces, under Rosecrans and Burnside, in the state had enjoyed near unimpeded superiority in the area since late July, capturing towns like Chattanooga and Knoxville. Unfortunately, Confederate reinforcements under Longstreet sent to serve General Braxton Bragg saw Rosecrans soundly defeated at Chickamauga on September 20, forcing Rosecrans to retreat and then be besieged at Chattanooga.^[140]

To address this disaster, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton quickly began organizing efforts to salvage the situation, and ordered Grant to Nashville on October 3, the two meeting on the 16. After giving Grant command over all Union forces between the Mississippi and the Appalachian Mountains, Stanton sent Grant to Chattanooga and authorized him to replace Rosecrans as head of the Army of the Cumberland with George H. Thomas.^[141] Admittedly, Grant had mixed feelings for the “Rock of Chickamauga” (named for his rearguard action at Chickamauga), recalling that “Thomas is too slow to move, and too brave to run away.”^[142] Yet this was still an upgrade from Rosecrans, as upon being informed of his new responsibility, Thomas stated that “we will hold the town till we starve.”^[143]

 Following his arrival on October 23, Grant quickly went to work, ending the siege through the establishment of a “cracker line” with pontoon bridges bringing in fresh food and ammo. Next, on November 4, Grant took advantage of Bragg sending Longstreet off to attack Burnside at Knoxville. Grant began planning a new assault along with the newly arrived Sherman, Hooker, and Thomas, having 80,000 men amongst them. Beginning on November 23, Union forces began advancing upon Confederate positions on the high ground, with Hooker first taking Lookout Mountain on the left and Sherman taking positions on the right. On the final and third day, Thomas led an assault up Missionary Ridge that routed the Confederates, sending Bragg and, by extent Longstreet running back to Georgia.^[144] The victory, while not a massacre for Bragg, was nonetheless impressive and ended Confederate operations in Tennessee and opened up Georgia to Union attack. It once again showed Grant’s logistical mind and tactical brilliance, having beaten the Confederate forces on higher ground and completely turning around the situation.

Washington Reborn

With so many successes under his belt, Grant would see honor after honor heaped upon him. Seemingly forgotten were the rumors of drunkenness and accusations of incompetence, as now, after years of failure, the Union finally seemed to have a general who could win. Such was Grant’s prestige that he not only received a gold medal and commendation from Congress on December 17, but many began calling for him to become President, a notion the humble Grant showed little interest in (much to Lincoln's relief).^[145] However, undoubtedly the greatest honor given to Grant was when Congress passed a bill that reinstated the rank of Lt. Gen. in the US Army. The bill was passed for Grant specifically, and brought back a rank in the Union army that hadn’t existed since George Washington. After the bill was passed on February 26, 1864, Grant was recalled to D.C. to receive the position, and upon taking his place as head of the US army, Grant spoke with Lincoln himself.^[146] According to Grant, the conversation went well, and Lincoln told Grant that he would have complete autonomy in his actions as head of all US forces. Yet Lincoln also specified that Grant would have to stay in the East and fight Lee with the Army of the Potomac.^[147]After all, if Grant could win the West, he could surely win the East.

Summary Analysis

As a commander, Grant excelled at nearly every aspect of the job. He was both a strong tactician and strategist, clearly knowing both how to win a battle, as shown by Shiloh and Chattanooga, and to make said battle an important steppingstone on the road to final victory as seen by victories such as Forts Henry & Donelson and Vicksburg. His use of ships for both combat and transport is also a strong example of early combined arms warfare. His logistical mind was also clearly well-rounded, having plenty of experience in keeping his forces supplied, living off the land, and even administering captured territory, governing it, and stamping down on smuggling. His tenacity is also worth mentioning. At Shiloh, he showed he could take a beating but keep on fighting. At Vicksburg, he showed he could learn from his mistakes and go on to improve his campaigns. However, he definitely had issues, particularly in terms of overconfidence, lack of awareness, and interservice rivalry. Several times, he was caught off guard because he failed to predict that the enemy would strike back. At Shiloh, he almost lost because of this blindness, while at Belmont, his inability to predict their counterattack forced him to withdraw. And while he did have the respect of commanders such as Sherman and McPherson, he also had a habit of making public enemies such as McClernand and, more private, less obvious ones like Halleck. Such rivalries, while not always entirely his fault due to the political nature of these men, did hinder his campaigns, and he found himself on the receiving end of bad media in part because of their accusations.

One Last Struggle - Lee Versus Grant from the Overland Campaign to Appomattox

In comparison to the previous Napoleonic style battles, the upcoming Overland Campaign is said to have had more in common with the grinding WW1 trench battles of Verdun than other campaigns in US history.^[148] Like so many of Lee’s previous battles, Grant and Lee appeared to be fighting for Richmond on the same land littered by many rivers and railroads. In contrast to before, however, Grant deployed other forces in Virginia to cut off Lee's supplies, including 30,000 men under Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler to attack Richmond from the south, and 17,500 men under Franz Sigel deployed around the Shenandoah Valley. His primary objective was Lee’s army, which, once destroyed, would end Confederate resistance. He openly told Meade that “Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also.”^[149] Lee, meanwhile, wanted to bleed Grant, hoping aggressive tactical action would inflict enough casualties to break Northern morale, crucial now more than ever since Lincoln’s elections were only a few months away. If successful, the Union may elect a new leader who would sue for peace.^[150]

It is important to remember, though, that the experience and responsibility of the two were vastly different. While for this campaign the two would only be commanding forces in Virginia, Grant had a much broader view of the war, presiding over 21 army corps, spread over 18 military departments and 533,000 battle-ready troops. Lee, on the other hand, commanded one army. Grant’s command over all Union forces meant that while he moved against Lee, he had generals like Sherman moving in Georgia against Johnston.^[151] As Sherman himself said, “Grant’s strategy embraced a continent; Lee’s a small state.”^[152] Simply put, every Union army had the same objective: destroy the remaining Confederate forces in front of them.  “He [Grant] was to go for Lee, and I [Sherman] was to go for Johnston.”^[153] This strategy also partly explains why Grant didn’t bring many of his former commanders, like Sherman, with him to Virginia, allowing Meade and his corps commanders, such as Burnside, Warren, Hancock, and Sedgwick (with the exception of Phillip Sheridan for cavalry), to maintain their positions in the Army of the Potomac.^[154] It also shows that Grant had a strong understanding of what his men could do, otherwise he couldn’t have given them such broad autonomy and resources.

Wilderness

            On May 4, Grant took his force of 115,000 men (roughly 4 corps) and began his campaign, crossing the Rapidan River and quickly moving south through an area of woodland known as the Wilderness, the same patch of forest Lee had beaten Hooker at during Chancellorsville. Grant hoped to move past this terrain before Lee’s 64,000 men could engage him here, yet the sheer size of his army made it easy for Lee to realize where he was.^[155] Lee, ever the aggressive man, quickly moved his forces into the area on May 5. Yet before forces under Longstreet could arrive to reinforce Lee, Union forces under Warren quickly attacked Hill and Ewell, and by the next day, the rebels were so tired they were being pushed back rapidly, only saved by the timely arrival of Longstreet.^[156] Following his arrival, Longstreet found a former railway line that he used to sneak behind the left flank and roll it up like a wet blanket, pushing Union forces under Hancock back briefly. However, this reenactment of Jackson’s flank two years earlier wasn’t complete until Longstreet was wounded by his own men in the chaos, and Union forces dug in and held their positions afterwards. Not long after a similar move was pulled on the Union right, seeing similar success and then failure, being the final major action of the battle.^[157] It was during this moment, when panic struck his subordinates, that Grant famously said, “Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is going to turn a double somersault and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think of what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.”^[158]

            By the end of the two-day battle, Union forces suffered around 17,000 losses to the rebels’ 11,000, nearly identical to Chancellorsville. Yet Grant himself, despite setbacks, viewed the battle as a draw, having not ceded ground and taken the first step toward victory.^[159] Lee, meanwhile was likely frustrated, as he had failed in his hopes to “get Wilderness Tavern Ridge and cut the enemy off from the river.”^[160] In contrast to past battles, Lee’s flanking maneuver had not broken or sent the Union forces running, and Grant holding firm in the face of this must have surprised Lee and his staff to a small degree at least. If anything, Lee had bled his army for nothing, not getting a withdrawal or even being able to say he outright won.

Spotsylvania Courthouse

            Following this first engagement, on the morning of May 7, Grant ordered his forces to move left of Lee’s forces and head toward more favorable terrain at Spotsylvania Courthouse. Marching at night, this move not only forced Lee to pull back closer to Richmond, but also drew jubilation from Union forces, happy to finally move south instead of north after a battle. Unfortunately, Lee was able to pick up on this and had begun moving toward Spotsylvania not long after, his smaller army, not burdened by long medical and supply trains, reaching the position first. By dark on May 8, both sides had begun moving their full forces to the area.^[161]

            After a day of rest and reorganizing, where Lee lost another commander, Hill, due to sickness, and the rebels spent time building up fortifications, the fighting continued anew. On May 10, Grant launched a series of assaults across the fortifications, even sending Hancock’s II Corps to attack the Confederate left and Burnside the right, though only one assault on the Confederate center called the “Mule Shoe” saw any success.^[162] Despite his success and the chewing out of Grant by the public, Lee seemed to believe Grant was acting smartly, stating, “I think General Grant has managed his affairs remarkably well up to this present time.” Furthermore, Lee also believed (if not hoped) that Grant would soon move out again, stating that “we must end this business on the battlefield, not in a fortified place.”^[163] This desire to move out, while likely based on Lee’s hatred of acting defensively, was also probably motivated by the fact that Grant’s 10,000 cavalry, under Philp Sheridan, had been enjoying themselves in attacking Confederate railways and supplies, even mortally wounding Stuart on May 11 outside of Richmond at Yellow Tavern.^[164] Staying put while this was happening behind him likely disquieted Lee, and his belief that Grant would move again made him decide to begin preparing troops and artillery to move. Unfortunately, Grant was not done with Spotsylvania, having told Lincoln that “[I] propose to fight it out on this line even if it takes me all summer.”^[165]

            And fight he did, as on May 12, Hancock’s men struck the Mule Shoe, pouring over Confederate entrenchments, capturing flags, guns, and men, and rapidly pushing the rebels back. Lee rushed reinforcements in, and for 20 hours the two forces slogged it out in the mud, throwing everything they had into the fight. By early May 13, after Confederates constructed fall back points, they withdrew, leaving Grant in possession of the “bloody angle,” Grant suffering 6,000-7,000 losses to Lee’s 8,000. Over the next few days, rain prevented major fighting, and the battle was effectively over, although there were some assaults on May 18.^[166]

            In total, Grant had lost 18,000 men to Lee’s 10,000-12,000, slightly higher than Wilderness, although both sides soon received reinforcements.^[167] Despite failing to break through, Grant had significantly bloodied the enemy and shaken their morale. One soldier remarked how  “we have met a man this time who either does not know when he is whipped, or who cares not if he loses his whole army, so that he may accomplish an end.”^[168] It is not hard to imagine how, in the face of this unstoppable force, some Confederates questioned whether victory was possible. Furthermore, Confederate command had been decimated, with 20 out of 57 corps, brigade, and division commanders out of action.^[169]

North Anna and Elsewhere

            While Grant was at Spotsylvania, the other armies in Virginia (Butler and Sigel) were struggling to achieve success. Both of these political generals had failed to achieve much against weaker armies south of Richmond and in Shenandoah, respectively. Butler was confined at Bermuda Hundred by Beauregard while Sigel was defeated by John C. Breckenridge, prompting his replacement by David Hunter.^[170]

            In the face of these failures, Grant and Lee had once again shifted. Lee had fallen back to behind the North Anna River by May 22. Upon arriving, Grant directed Hancock and Warren to make several advances on May 23, leaving Lee’s center to have an inverted V formation. However, despite this precarious position, the strain of the conflict left Lee bedridden, and no attack was launched.  Meanwhile, Grant (with fresh reinforcements) had decided against further perilous river crossings and once again planned to move south of Lee’s left towards the James, forcing Lee back closer and closer to Richmond, while also denying him a chance to inflict further losses.^[171]

            Overall, despite this battle’s lack of battle (comparatively), Lee’s mood following it was still bad. He lamented that an attack hadn’t been made during this time, berating his officers, asking one, “why didn’t you throw your whole force on them and drive them back as Jackson would have done?”^[172] The move by Grant on the James River, where he could receive naval support, also scared Lee, who stated to Davis, “If he gets there, it will become a siege, and then, it will be a mere question of time.”^[173] And finally, the recent successes of Grant’s army (albeit at a high price) had reinforced the morale of the Federals, with Grant stating, “even our officers have ceased to regard Lee as an invincible military genius.”^[174] To many, Lee no longer seemed godlike, and morale was on the rise. If it wasn’t for what happened next, this may have continued.

Cold Harbour

            Moving out on May 27, the Army of the Potomac’s vanguard was headed by Sheridan’s cavalry, scouting ahead along the north bank of the Pamunkey River. Lee, unsure of what Grant was doing, withdrew to a position behind Totopotomoy Creek, just 10 miles north of Richmond. By May 28, both sides' cavalry was scouting the area between Pamunkey and Totopotomoy, trying to ascertain the other’s movements. May 30 saw brief counterattacks by Lee that failed and the probing of Lee’s lines by Grant. The stalemate ended when Sheridan scouted and then attacked Confederate forces stationed at a crossroad called Old Cold Harbor, pushing them back before withdrawing, as Lee began deploying his own forces there en masse to secure his southern flank.^[175]

            By June 1, Confederate forces under Anderson arrived and attempted to attack Sheridan’s new position, although Sheridan held out long enough for the rest of the Union army to arrive. Upon arrival, Grant surveyed the area and believed that if he applied enough pressure, he might be able to break through to Richmond (it should be noted at this point that there was significant political pressure to make significant progress). However, due to delays on his own side, the attack was delayed until June 3, by which point Lee had fortified the sections Grant planned to attack.^[176] During the assault, 60,000 Union troops (out of 109,000) attacked Lee’s right, but a mix of fortifications and terrain meant that 7,000 men would be killed or wounded to Lee’s 1,000, making it the only battle of the campaign where Grant’s casualties were proportionately higher than Lee’s. This battle was where Grant received the moniker “Butcher,” and he received much criticism for the blunder, with some even calling for peace.^[177] Nevertheless, Lincoln held out faith in Grant, quoting Shakespeare and saying that “the heavens are hung in black.”^[178]

            Cold Harbour was the last major battle of the Overland Campaign, with the grim total being 55,000 Union casualties to 33,000 Rebels over a month of combat.^[179] On paper, it appears Lee came out the victor in terms of being bled, but statistically, his losses counted for over half of his combat strength at the start of the campaign, not to mention the number of officers lost to combat or sickness, such as Longstreet, Hill, Ewell, and Stuart. Furthermore, unlike every general before him with the same resources, Grant had pushed Lee back to Richmond, making his casualties actually worth something. And while Grant had been mauled (unnecessarily at times), he could replace his losses, while Lee couldn’t. After Cold Harbour, Lee told an official from Richmond that he didn’t have a single regiment in reserve, and that if he shortened the line, Grant could flank him. If he lengthened it, Grant could punch through. Either way, if Grant chose to attack again, he would be defeated.^[180] And unfortunately for Lee, Grant had little interest in stopping.

From the James to Appomattox

            Following the bloodbath at Cold Harbour, Grant decided to once again circumnavigate Lee’s position. On June 7, Grant sent Sheridan north to destroy Confederate supply hubs and draw away Lee’s attention, while the rest of his army moved south again on June 12. After conferring with Butler about his plans, Grant reached the James River by June 14 and crossed it using expertly built pontoon bridges. He quickly sent William F. Smith to attack Petersburg, the supply hub to Richmond. Unfortunately, Smith did not take advantage of the weak garrison, allowing Lee enough time to shake off his confusion and reinforce the city by June 18, two days after the rest of Grant’s army crossed the James.^[181] With this failure by his subordinate, Grant settled into a siege and established a base of operations at City Point. After initial assaults, the two armies settled into a few months of relative idleness in their fortifications, with the only exceptions being occasional assaults on the flanks in late June and August to further cut off Petersburg. One notable attempt during this time was the Battle of the Crater on July 30, where Union forces blew a mine under Confederate fortifications and unsuccessfully tried to rush through to Petersburg, although it failed and saw heavy losses. Yet by no means did this mean Grant or Lee were inactive elsewhere. On June 12, Lee sent 15,000 men under Jubal Early to raid Washington in an attempt to get Grant recalled from Petersburg, though ultimately, Early would be pushed back by July 11. Afterwards, Grant would send Sheridan to take command of forces in Shenandoah on July 31 and ensure Early couldn’t pull a stunt like that again.^[182]

            Furthermore, Grant had also been monitoring Sherman’s advance on Atlanta, Georgia and his subsequent marches to the sea and through the Carolinas. Atlanta’s capture on September 2 was a major blow to the Confederacy, the loss of ammunition from the city badly affecting Lee’s army while also giving Lincoln proof of the war’s success and earning him reelection. Then, in another sign of strategic brilliance, Grant met with Sheridan on September 15, and after some discussion, let him loose on Early in Shenandoah, who from September 19 to October 19 was “whipped” in a number of battles, all while Sheridan pillaged the countryside for crops and cattle, cutting off Lee from further supplies. During both of these campaigns, Grant outlined his objectives to his men while also giving them plenty of breathing room to act as they saw fit, leading to devastating results. The only time Grant got remotely too involved with a general was with George Thomas in Tennessee. This was when he took a bit too long for Grant’s liking in dealing with a 40,000-strong army led by Hood, which he nevertheless smashed by December 13 near Nashville.^[183] And while Grant left his good commanders to do their thing, after the election, he also began removing the more incompetent political commanders such as Sigel and Butler, since the fear of political reprisal was no longer a problem.^[184]

            These actions, combined with continuous assaults and maneuvers on Lee’s lines and even outside of Richmond, put serious strain on Lee and the Confederacy. With his lines being spread thin and his men running low on supplies, Lee told Davis on November 2 that “I fear a great calamity will befall us.”^[185] Yet at the same time, Lee did not do much to help his situation other than remain where he was. He openly dismissed the threat of Sherman advancing up from the south, saying that it wasn’t possible that “Sherman can make the march [from Colombia to North Carolina to link up with Schofield] anticipated by Genl Beauregard if our troops can do anything.”^[186] Even when he was made Commander in Chief of all Confederate armies in early 1865, he shrugged off the opportunity to change the overall situation by stating, “If I had the ability, I would not have the time.”^[187]

            By January 1865, the situation was dire for Lee, and his army of 57,000 men was rapidly decreasing. He was facing mass desertion (one regiment per day), famine, and worst of all, Sherman was now speeding up his advance northward, capturing Columbia by February 17, and Goldsboro by March 23. As he advanced further, Lee would soon need to decide whether to stay and be surrounded, or escape and face the numerically stronger Union forces (217,000 between Grant and Sherman) in the open.^[188] Either way, as Sherman put it, “The game is then up with Lee.”^[189]

            By this point, the only concern for Grant was that Lee might slip away and escape before he could be ensnared. He was admittedly confused that Lee hadn’t done so earlier, stating that “if he had left Richmond when Sherman invaded Georgia, it would have given us another year of war.”^[190] Nevertheless, Grant decided to apply a little more pressure. On March 29, taking direct command along with Sheridan, due to his other subordinates' many failures, Grant began rolling up Lee’s flanks at Petersburg, forcing a withdrawal from the city and Richmond itself on April 2. Yet instead of taking the capital, Grant simply followed Lee west, with Sheridan in particular hounding Lee’s stragglers, defeating a large portion on April 6 at Sayler’s Creek. After two more days of stubbornly fighting on, Lee finally caved and met with Grant at Appomattox Courthouse, surrendering to Grant on April 9, 1865, and ending the US Civil War.

Final Analysis

            As we have seen, both Grant and Lee were skilled commanders who had a number of similarities. Both men were West Point attendees, veterans of the Mexican-American War, respected and reliable commanders in their respective theaters, and had strong relationships with the presidents of their respective sides. And above all, they were aggressive, both following a motto that was well outlined by Grant. “But in war, anything is better than indecision. We must decide. If I am wrong, we shall soon find out, and can do the other thing. But not to decide wastes both time and money and may ruin everything.”^[191]

            To answer the question of who was truly the better general, we will rely on the previously mentioned model of Daniel Lynch, which includes the following: developing an operational plan to achieve strategic/operational objectives, informing ones subordinates of that plan, controlling the execution of that plan and modifying it if necessary, and ensuring the forces allocated to that plan are well supplied.

Strategic and Operational Plans

            In terms of developing plans to achieve certain objectives, both men understood the objectives of the war for their respective sides and developed plans to achieve them. For Lee, his strategy focused on defending Richmond, while also breaking Northern morale by defeating Northern armies and inflicting heavy casualties. Grant, meanwhile, first aimed to take Confederate territory along the Mississippi to cut it in half, then, upon his promotion aimed to destroy the Southern capability to fight war on all fronts, primarily by defeating their military force in the field and cutting off their supplies. For their respective sides and objectives, these strategies were arguably the best ways to achieve victory. However, Lee’s plans were more flawed, both in what they sought to achieve and in scope.

            First of all, Lee’s plan was, albeit reasonable, based a little too much on hope. While it made sense that annihilating or even just beating the Union army would break Union morale, it was still a big ask as to whether Lee could shatter Union morale, much less destroy the enemy army. In an era when weaponry made each engagement so bloody for the enemy that achieving decisive results was difficult, it was a big gamble to hope that winning one battle would end the war. And ultimately, it didn't. Even after impressive victories at the Second Bull Run or Chancellorsville, the North, while shaken, did not sue for peace and showed a willingness to keep fighting. This turned those victories, which hadn’t won any ground or resources, into events that simply weakened Lee further, playing into the attritional war he sought to avoid.

And in terms of scope, Lee’s focus was way too narrow. While protecting Richmond, the political heart of the Confederacy, was important (and Lee did a good job of this), Lee would actively use his reputation to divert forces or attention from other necessary fronts, such as Vicksburg. Even when he wasn’t the official head of all Confederate forces, Lee still made clear to Davis that his front was of the greatest priority. He balked at the idea of sending reinforcements to the West, even when such moves could help, such as Longstreet’s deployment at the Battle of Chickamauga. He showed incredible bias for his own front, and his promises to end the war with reinforcements not only failed but led to horrific losses in the West.

Speaking of the West, Grant’s strategic vision was leagues above Lee's. Long before taking charge of the Union war effort, Grant was planning moves and winning battles that achieved much more than killing the enemy. His very first victories at Forts Henry & Donelson not only won ground for the Union, but opened key rivers for further advances, advances that would slowly cut the Confederacy in two and bleed Confederate manpower and resources. In an ultimate irony, Grant actually achieved what Lee always sought more than once: the destruction of an enemy army.  And while it may seem hypocritical to applaud Grant for destroying enemy armies while deriding Lee’s attempts, it’s clear that the Confederacy couldn’t afford to lose an army or significant numbers of men, while the Union could. As such, Grant was taking a much smaller risk in attempting to destroy enemy armies, as even if he suffered heavy losses, he could generally replace them in short order.

In terms of his vision, while Grant was originally only focused on the Western Front, that is largely because that was where his authority extended. Once made head of the army, he coordinated all Union forces across Georgia, Virginia, Tennessee, Alabama, and the Carolinas, ensuring that even if he was struggling, other generals like Sherman were seeing massive success, success that would weaken Confederate forces on other fronts, whether through denying reinforcements or denying supplies. Simply put, his vision was much larger and encompassing than Lee’s.

Informing/Dealing with Subordinates

            The interesting thing about subordinates for these two is that they each were missing a crucial ingredient that the other had. While Lee had many competent subordinates, he didn’t always instruct or listen to them well. On the other hand, Grant could instruct his subordinates well, but would sometimes ask perhaps more than they were capable of, as they would often mess up (albeit exceptions like Sherman and Sheridan).

            Lee had a strong mix of subordinates who were competent at their jobs, from aggressive go-getters like Jackson, the cautious yet clever Longstreet, and the flamboyant Stuart, all of whom had proven their mettle at some point. Jackson displayed his capabilities at Seven Days and Chancellorsville, while for Longstreet it was at Second Bull Run. Yet Lee’s practice of not being crystal clear in his instructions or hopes, most notably at Gettysburg and the Overland Campaign, caused him unneeded difficulties that resulted in missed opportunities and losses. At Gettysburg, Lee both gave too much autonomy to Stuart, whose absence left him blind, while his orders to Ewell to take the hills “if practicable” meant that Ewell failed to achieve a golden opportunity that could have ended July 1 with a complete victory. During the Overland Campaign (and even before) Lee often berated officers for their failures in destroying the enemy army, taking their limited success (which in and of itself was impressive) for granted, and having expectations that were too high. Furthermore, Lee also ignored the advice of his men on too many occasions. For example, at both Antietam and Gettysburg, Longstreet advised against splitting the forces up and fighting on the battlefield, respectively. Lee’s decision to overrule him seemingly led both these northern expeditions to fail.

            Grant, meanwhile, generally gave clear orders to subordinates while also giving them autonomy. While this could work for generals like Sherman in Atlanta or Sheridan in Shenandoah, less competent commanders failed to achieve his objectives. There are many examples, yet a good one was William F. Smith in his march on Petersburg. Grant had just managed to sneak across the James River and past an oblivious Lee, sending Smith on to finish the job and take Petersburg. Yet despite the obvious orders and the ease with which this could have been accomplished, Smith took his time and gave the city time to be reinforced, resulting in a long, bloody siege.

            This, of course, raises the question of why Grant kept such men around. The answer is that in most cases, he had to. Many of these incompetent generals (such as Butler, Sigel, or McClernand) were political generals who, if alienated, could spread dissent against the Lincoln administration. If this happened, Lincoln could be replaced by a more pro-peace candidate, undoing Grant’s efforts. As such, Grant often had to wait for a major mistake by these men before he could dispose of them. And once Lincoln was elected, Grant went to work removing such men.

            It is also important to remember that many of these “incompetent” men were from the Army of the Potomac, which Grant had only recently taken command of in 1864. It is fair to assume that Grant needed time to get used to the new army and vice versa, especially since the army was very cautious after the many defeats it suffered against Lee. If Grant had brought more Western generals over, things might have gone more smoothly.

Execution/Modification of the Plan

            When it came to executing a battle, both men clearly knew how to win, as seen by their many victories. Lee was a strong tactician who could use Napoleonic flair to win engagements against absurd odds, with many of his battles, such as Chancellorsville, Second Bull Run, and Seven Days, serving as examples of this. And while not as flashy, Grant could still pull off impressive victories, such as the turnaround at Shiloh or the masterpiece of taking the fortified Vicksburg. But while both men could win a battle, only one of them could consistently adapt a plan.

            As stated before, Lee did not like to intervene in a battle once it started, leaving it in the hands of God and his sub-commanders, although battles such as Antietam and the Overland Campaign forced him to break this policy due to desperate circumstances. Yet where Lee truly failed in adapting was his general policy to stay the course and fight on. Once committed to a battle, Lee rarely chose to withdraw. At Gettysburg, even after two days of failure, he decided to stay and try again with catastrophic results on the third day. During the Overland Campaign and again at Petersburg, even when Grant had him on the backfoot, Lee still was determined to hold Virginia to the last, even as Sherman came up from the south with a baseball bat. And worst of all, he didn’t change his overall strategy as the war dragged on. When it was clear that bleeding the North dry and breaking morale wasn’t working, he continued to do it. When his first invasion of the North failed, he attempted a repeat in the same manner and with the same objectives to predictably bad results. And even as Richmond and Petersburg fell, he still held out hope for a victory that was dead alongside Jackson.

            Grant, meanwhile, could adapt to the situation. After his first Vicksburg campaign in late 1862 failed, he didn’t try the same thing again, but rather came up with a new plan that worked. In Virginia, whenever he was stalled or couldn’t break through, he shifted his line to try to break through somewhere else. And if frontal assaults, such as at Cold Harbour or Petersburg, couldn’t work, he would avoid implementing them, something a “Butcher” probably wouldn’t do. Even when he did suffer heavy losses, such as at Shiloh or during the Overland Campaign, he would quickly change what he was doing, and the losses would reduce significantly, as seen at Petersburg, where, after initial assaults, he stopped and settled into a siege.

Supplying Forces

            Finally, there is the management of supplies, and this one is not even a contest. Even with the North’s material superiority over the South, the fact was that Lee did little more than complain about his needs to Davis, it being common for him to say “the men are in good health and spirits, but want shoes and clothes badly.”^[192]

            When dealing with the problem of his own needs, Lee would take that problem and make it way worse than it already was through a desperate scheme. The main type of scheme Lee employed was heading north and raiding for supplies, such as at Harpers Ferry or for food in the Shenandoah Valley. The problem with this approach, however, is that in order to get these supplies, Lee had to use up supplies, and considering how his army was often between 60,000 and 75,000 strong, those supplies could be burned up quickly. Furthermore, such a large force probably couldn’t live off the land for too long, considering that the Union forces in the area were doing the same thing.

            But what about Grant? After all, he and Sherman also lived off the land and enjoyed massive success. The difference there is that while Grant did rely on food from the South to feed his army (particularly at Vicksburg) it was less about needing to and more because he could. Unlike Lee, who couldn’t constantly burden the South’s limited resources on his army, Grant lived off the land primarily because it was more convenient than lengthy supply trains and because it actively hurt the South. Every farm he looted, or plantation he burned, hurt the Southern war effort. Furthermore, even when he was relying on Northern resources, his experience as a quartermaster in Mexico and his time spent administering captured land meant that he was an expert in managing an army’s needs from food, ammunition, clothing, firewood, etc. Not only did this experience help his own forces, but it also meant he understood how to hurt the South’s resources, making his move to let Sherman loose in Georgia a much smarter decision in hindsight.

Conclusion

            At the end of the day, both Grant and Lee were talented commanders, and they were both two of the best military minds of their generation in the United States. Both knew the business of war, how to win a battle, and had solid concepts of how to achieve their goals.

            Yet despite all his skill and glory in the face of overwhelming odds, Lee, relying on the old Napoleonic era way of thinking, often failed to translate impressive tactical success into something bigger and conflict changing. Instead, he slowly bled his already depleted and ill-supplied forces down, suffering casualties at a higher rate than not just Grant, but many of the men he beat. As much as Lost Cause enthusiasts may wish to deny it, if anyone should be called a “Butcher”, it is Robert E. Lee.

            Grant, meanwhile, despite suffering heavy losses and making plenty of his own mistakes, ultimately managed to coordinate all the well-supplied and equipped Union forces to achieve total victory in the Civil War. In stark contrast to Lee, he abandoned the chessboard mentality of simply winning battles and embraced a strategic vision considered essential in the modern era to winning wars.

In many ways, the Civil War was a transition period. By the end, the days of linear tactics from the previous century, where men would win battles and thus wars were over, and in its place a new kind of mentality emerged. The Napoleon of the South failed to adapt to this, while Grant did. As one soldier once said, “there was no Bonaparte, posturing for effect”.^[193] Instead, there was Ulysses S. Grant, ushering in the death of the Confederacy, the death of slavery, and the birth of a new mentality to war.