To what extent were German objectives during the Ardennes Offensive achievable and a risk to the Allies' success?

Section 1 - Identification and Evaluation of Sources 

The question for this investigation is: To what extent were German objectives during the Ardennes Offensive achievable? To answer this, both The Battle of the Bulge: The German View: Perspectives from Hitler's High Command by Danny S. Parker and Ardennes: Translation of Written Questions Answered by Generaloberst Alfred Jodl and Approved by General Feldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, July 20, 1945, from Walter Bedell Smith and Kenneth W. Hechler were analyzed.

Danny S. Parker, The Battle of the Bulge: The German View: Perspectives from Hitler's High Command 

The origin of the source is a historical research book by WW2 historian/writer Danny S. Parker published in 2016, serving as part of a series on the Ardennes Offensive. This is valuable as the book was written and researched after several decades where analysis and information could have appeared, and was written by someone who was knowledgeable on the larger subject of the Ardennes Offensive. The purpose is to provide insight into German leaders' perspectives on the attack, a value to my investigation in order to understand the achievability of Allied military objectives during the Ardennes. Furthermore, the content proves its value by giving the differences in opinion between leaders like Adolf Hitler, Alfred Jodl, Gert von Rundstedt, and Walter Model. However, this is also a limit, as there is no such information on major Allied leaders like Dwight D. Eisenhower, Bernard Montgomery, or Charles De Gaulle.

Walter Bedell Smith and Kenneth W. Hechler, Ardennes: Translation of Written Questions Answered by Generaloberst Alfred Jodl and Approved by General Feldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, July 20, 1945

This source’s origin is an interview of General Alfred Jodl on July 20, 1945, by US Army officers. This is a value, as not only are we getting information directly from a key German commander, but it is also only a few months after the battle occurred, meaning the details of outcomes and key developments are still remembered by Jodl. The purpose of this interview is valuable as the interviewers (Smith and Hechler) aim to ascertain the German (mainly Jodl's) viewpoint and objectives. By doing this, Jodl shares how the offensive failed due to factors like German resources, objectives, and the Allied response, key for my research. Content-wise, however, the source can be limiting. First, the interview is only of Jodl, and there is no information from the differing perspectives of Model, Rundtstedt, and even Hitler. Granted, Jodl is a high-ranking commander, so he isn’t uninformed on the plan; rather, he doesn’t know how his subordinates/peers felt about the operation and its chances of success, an opinion that varied significantly. The other limit that comes from the interview with Jodl is that we get no concrete information on the Allied situation. Again, Jodl was a top German general and wouldn’t know such things, but we get no inclination of what the Allies, with better resources and rapid responses, felt or knew during the battle in comparison to Germans like Jodl.

Section 2 - Investigation

On Dec 16, 1944, Hitler launched the surprise Ardennes Offensive, breaking through a weak point in American lines. Aimed at Antwerp, the offensive sought to cut off Allied supplies and encircle 20-30 Allied Divisions, forcing the West to negotiate peace. Ultimately, by January 21, German forces withdrew, having lost 81-98,000 men. Today, this offensive is often viewed as a desperate gamble. However, I posit that while the objectives listed above weren’t achievable, the goals of a limited advance to the Meuse and of weakening the Allies’ position were achievable due to German and Allied Intelligence/Counterintelligence, the Allied situation and forces, and the German situation and forces. 

To say American forces in the Ardennes were prepared for battle would be an understatement. SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) under Dwight D. Eisenhower did not expect an attack due to the suspected weakness of German forces (poor morale, supplies).  Many commanders believed the Germans would only attack for a “spoiling attack”, responding to future Allied offensives. As such, they failed to see the coming storm and were ill-suited for any battle they didn’t initiate. For their part, the Germans worked hard to deprive the Allies of this notion, with measures such as limited radio use and restricted daytime movement used to ensure surprise. This concealed the already unexpected buildup of forces, adding to Allied misconceptions and ensuring that Allied forces in the region and elsewhere along the frontline did not have a functional plan to tackle a German attack. These actions would theoretically give the Germans plenty of time to make at least minor advances. And while those occurred, the Allies would be quarreling with each other over how to salvage the situation.

While US Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton had effectively responded the night after the attack with overwhelming force, the response was handicapped by internal disagreements. At this point, the Broad Front Strategy, aiming to apply pressure across the entire front, had left Allied lines overstretched and suffering from attrition. In particular, only 4 inexperienced or battle-weary divisions guarded the Ardennes. However, there were 76 divisions along the entire Western front, with the 12th army group (three armies) being quickly sent as relief. As a final bonus, improving weather conditions allowed the massive Allied air force to dominate the skies, bombing German supplies and forces with impunity. Facing growing numbers of Allied reinforcements, and with strained logistics bombed, German forces were gradually slowed down and stopped, and by December 18 it was clear that reaching the Meuse, much less Antwerp, was impossible. Despite this overall failure, the attack had succeeded in dividing Allied command. Eisenhower had become increasingly frustrated with his British and French Allies, as the former’s primary commander in the area, Bernard Montgomery, had demanded larger areas of control yet insisted that he wasn't ready to counterattack from the North. The French, meanwhile, under Charles De Gaulle, repeatedly threatened to pull their forces from Eisenhower if he abandoned French territory (like Strasbourg) through strategic withdrawals. Ultimately, these issues were resolved, but it did prove Hitler wasn’t entirely wrong in his assumption that he could sow tension between the Allies, albeit he wasn’t able to force a peace settlement. Yet while Allied commanders bickered over what to do, German Generals were resigned to the failure of a plan that didn’t have the men or sense to succeed.

While OB West (German Western Front Command) was happy to launch an offensive, Hitler’s definition of “offensive” was suicidal and idiotic to them. On paper, there were 34-35 divisions for the attack, consisting of the 6th, 7th, and 5th armies with SS support, from an estimated total of 1.5 million men in the West, with 20,000 per division. However, it should be remembered that this force was simultaneously supposed to secure territory stretching all the way to Antwerp, catch 20-30 Allied divisions, and hold off Allied counterattacks while running low on supplies. Unsurprisingly, both Generals Walter Model and Gert Von Rundstedt were defeatist, saying “This plan hasn’t got a damn leg to stand on” and “If we had reached the Meuse, we should have gotten down on our knees and thanked God,” respectively. And if both men, being experienced commanders, were skeptical of a push to the Meuse, much less Antwerp, then that hardly speaks well to the feasibility of the plan. However, they weren’t opposed to an attack, believing it was the only way to retain initiative, and thus proposed a more realistic “Little Plan”, only calling for a push to the Meuse with more air and infantry support. Although this plan was discarded, it included objectives that were technically met during the attack. In a sense, the question wasn’t whether an attack should occur, but at what scale, and looking back on the result of the battle, the “Little Plan” was much more realistic to the situation on the ground and achievable. Fortunately, Hitler was not privy to this realism.

  Optimistic would not be the wrong word to describe Hitler’s perspective, but unrealistic also suffices. Desperate to turn the tide of the war, Hitler’s intent was to break the Allies' will to fight and make victory seem impossible, stating, “This will never be as possible through a successful defensive as a successful offensive operation.” And the best place for a successful offensive would be the Ardennes Forest, where his army had not only previously advanced through easily to take over France in 1940, but where the enemy was perceived to be weak-willed Americans who would leave the war once morale dissipated. However, Hitler seemed to forget that his forces were facing supply shortages and that the majority of the men who had liberated France were these same ‘weak-willed’ Americans. Nevertheless, he was confident in victory, with Eisenhower recalling how captured Germans said they aimed to reach the Meuse in two days and Antwerp in three weeks, while Chief of Staff Alfred Jodel (Hitler’s top commander) believed it would take six weeks for an Allied response. As previously stated, though, Eisenhower acted immediately, and the Meuse was never reached, showing just how disconnected these Germans were from the situation. In later reflection, Jodl blamed the offensive’s failure on the following: poor roads, unexpected resistance, poor troop training, lack of transport, allied air power, and allied response. Based on this, it can be assumed that if these problems were solved, the offensive could have succeeded or fared better. However, the problem is that very few of these issues could be solved, either because the Germans couldn’t know or stop Allied actions or because they lacked the time and resources to improve their own problems. Simply put, Hitler and Jodl conceived a plan that could have worked if they had the resources they didn’t have.

In conclusion, the vast majority of objectives in the Ardennes offensive were not achievable, primarily because of a lack of resources and manpower. While German forces had achieved a surprise attack, the Allies were only taken unaware because the idea of a German attack made no military sense. While this did lead to some early successes, the ground gained in the attack would only have satisfied the objectives of the “Little Plan” and didn’t even meet the early objectives of the enacted plan. Had Hitler and Jodl listened to OB West, a smaller, less ambitious offensive may have succeeded in encircling fewer Allied divisions, disrupting future Allied operations while also not risking Germany’s last reserves. However, this still wouldn’t have changed the war’s outcome, and any offensive action would have simply been the last gasp of the dying Third Reich.

Section 3 - Reflection

In the process of investigating the feasibility of the German Ardennes Offensive, I conducted myself in a manner reflecting that of a historian while also facing similar challenges. During my research, I initially hoped that I could rely on a wealth of both primary sources from German commanders, as well as secondary sources with much debate for my original question of To What Extent were German objectives realistic during and after the Ardennes Offensive. However, two major problems occurred. First, while there were primary sources from German commanders, most of them were in unreadable German. Second, most sources I found expressed skepticism over the offensive's long-term success, leaving little room for evaluating different perspectives. This, combined with my questions' broad nature, forced me to alter the direction that my work would take, compelling me to evaluate/use primary sources as well as change my question.

Responding to my research question was not without issue either, holding other challenges for historians. The biggest challenge was what “vital” information I should include. While researching, I found that sources such as The Ardennes Offensive by Samuel J. Newland and Clayton K.S. Chun could be very descriptive, and I began to question what information was necessary. For example, many sources argued the importance of General George S. Patton during the battle, and based on my knowledge and interest, I was eager to mention him. However, while he has a legendary reputation, he had little to evaluate for my question. Now, while for some having to mention less is great, it felt almost criminal to neglect information about the battle, even if it was ultimately irrelevant. 

I would consider bias and vanity to be weaknesses for any historian/writer. When they analyze sources and write a response based on their perspective, it is inevitable that their work holds biases related to their political, religious, ethnic, or social beliefs, as well as what they seek to achieve with their work. However, I found that my writing was not heavily clouded by my American patriotism or disgust for the Third Reich, but rather by the desire to "bridge new ground”. Essentially, I conducted this project with the aim of not simply repeating what other historians had said, but to create a more independent work. Ultimately, however, after reminding myself that this was a simple investigation, not a groundbreaking discovery, I tempered my aspirations and was able to write a response that was much less unique, but nevertheless based on shared, proven facts.

Works Cited

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Chun, Clayton K.S. The Ardennes Offensive. The European Campaign:. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2011. Accessed April 1, 2026. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12096.13.

Dahl, Arden B. The Battle of the Bulge. Command Dysfunction. Air University Press, 1998. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13807.11.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Diary Entry, January 14, 1945." Unpublished manuscript, January 14, 1945. Accessed April 6, 2026. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/ardennes-battle-bulge/033-051.pdf.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Diary Entry, January 21, 1945." Unpublished manuscript, January 21, 1945. Accessed April 6, 2026. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/ardennes-battle-bulge/033-052.pdf.

Jodl, Alfred. "Ardennes: Translation of Written Questions Answered by Generaloberst Alfred Jodl and Approved by General Feldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, July 20, 1945." Interview by Walter Bedell Smith and Kenneth W. Hechler. Eisenhower Presidential Library. National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed April 6, 2026. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/ardennes-battle-bulge/102-009.pdf.

Parker, Danny S. The Battle of the Bulge: The German View: Perspectives from Hitler's High Command. Frontline Books, 2016.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. "German Plans for Victory, 1944-45." Central European History 26, no. 2 (1993): 215-28. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4546332.

Yelton, David K. "'Ein Volk Steht Auf': The German Volkssturm and Nazi Strategy, 1944-45." The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (2000): 1061-83. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://doi.org/10.2307/2677267.